INTRODUCTION
'International law is a legal system.' Thus begins the first of 42 conclusions formulated by the ILC Study Group on the fragmentation of international law. 1 The sentence is more a postulate than an actual conclusion, and a disputed one at that. After all, much of the current discussion on the fragmentation of international law is motivated precisely by the suspicion that international law might actually not be a system, at least not an internally coherent one the way we think of domestic legal systems. The Study Group thus postulates an answer to an ontological question -whether international law actually is a system -in order to answer the technical question of how to deal with conflicts and interrelation between its rules. This is difficult enough for the kind of conflicts that the report identifies as the most relevant ones: conflicts between 'principles that may often point in different directions … new types of treaty clauses or practices that may not be compatible with old general law or the law of some other specialized branch'. 2 The discovery of Multisource That said, extensive discussions of when and how a private international law approach would actually work to resolve public international law conflicts do not exist.
Jenks discusses conflict avoidance more than conflict resolution. Jessup uses tools that are not those of conflict of laws. Fischer-Lescano and Teubner argue that the special character of conflicts among regimes requires the development of substantive norms, without a satisfactory explanation as to why exactly this should be so. 13 Moreover, there is relatively little discussion on which of these two approaches is to be preferred under what circumstances. The reason may be that scholars writing in the field start from a certain assumption on the ontological challenge -namely, that international law is or should be a coherent system, or that it is not -and derive rules from that assumption.
In this article, we do not set out to place the ontological question of whether international law is a system at the beginning of the research. Rather, we begin with a presentation of the two different approaches and a discussion of the prerequisites for their respective applicability (Parts II and III). We then discuss how these two approaches map on to the discussion of fragmentation of international law, without actually, at this stage, 15 See, eg, Pauwelyn (n 5) at 367-80 (referring to 'the fiction of "legislative intent"' and difficulty of putting a time-label on a treaty in the context of the lex posterior principle as it applies in public international law) and Koskenniemi Report (n 2), para 255 (p 130) ('the argument from lex posterior or lex specialis [both conflict-of-norms rules] seems clearly more powerful between treaties within a regime than between treaties in different regimes. In the former case, the legislative analogy seems less improper than in the case of two treaties concluded with no conscious sense that they are part of the "same project"').
A. SOLUTIONS IN DOMESTIC LAW
Legal systems provide their own tools to establish their internal coherence. 16 More than one rule may a priori be applicable to a set of facts. Institutionally, internal coherence is established mainly through highest courts. Doctrinally, the solution lies in legal rules that determine the relation between different norms. European law in the civil law tradition (which historically relied less on courts to establish internal coherence procedurally) has been particularly robust in developing a number of presumptions of statutory interpretation to resolve conflicts between norms, but similar solutions are found in the common law.
A first set of conflict rules acts at the level of hierarchy of norms. Thus, under the rule of lex superior derogat legi inferiori, the hierarchically superior rule trumps the hierarchically inferior. It is for this reason that constitutional law trumps ordinary statutory law, which in turn trumps common law rules; mandatory rules of contract law trump party agreements, and these agreements in turn trump subsidiary rules of contract law.
Where no such hierarchy of sources exists and rules are enacted in the same field, for example in contract law, a second set of conflict rules must be developed. As between more general and more specific rules, for example, the one with the more specific scope of application applies (lex specialis derogate lege generali). Thus, general contract law is trumped by the specific rules on consumer contracts on the one hand or by those on commercial contracts on the other. Under the rule of lex posterior derogat lege anterior, a later rule is presumed to trump an earlier rule. Both lex specialis and lex posterior are presumptions as to the intent of the lawmaker or legislator on the issue in question.
Presumably, a lawmaker, in regulating a specific area, wants to create special rules that trump the general rules in the field. As a consequence, the presumption is that the latest and/or most specific legislative expression matters and prevails. 
III. INTERACTIONS BETWEEN LEGAL SYSTEMS: CONFLICT OF LAWS
A.
SOLUTIONS IN DOMESTIC LAW
One reason, then, for why conflicts between different legal systems are governed by different rules than are conflicts within one legal system, is that the rules developed for intra-systemic conflict do not work well in the context of inter-systemic conflict. There is no hierarchy between different legal systems, except for the relative hierarchy that each system may claim for itself over others. There is no overarching system within which rules on statutory interpretation could achieve coherence. There is no uniform legislative intent on which the resolution could be based. There is no neutral or mutually accepted standard under which different values could be balanced.
The alternative is not anarchy but private international law. In private international law, several methods exist on how to resolve conflicts between legal systems. With gross simplification, it may be appropriate to present three methods: the traditional method, governmental interest analysis, and functional analysis. While the first two are tied to conflicts between state laws, the third one is more promising for international law.
The first method, here called the traditional method, exists in both Europe and the United States, with some differences that need not concern us here. 27 Under the traditional method, the applicable law is determined on the basis of conflict-of-laws rules designed for different areas of law in the abstract, without regard to the content of the substantive law. Essentially, determining the applicable law is a three-step endeavour. In a first step, the matter in question must be characterized as one of contract law, tort law, procedure, etc, so the applicable choice-of-law rule (eg that for contract or tort) can be of the applicable law on the basis of a connecting factor. Most of these connecting factors are either territorial (the place of the tort for matters of tort, the place of performance for matters of contract law, etc.) or personal (the law of nationality or of domicile for matters of personal status, etc.). In a third and final step, the law so determined is applied unless its application would violate the public policy of the forum law.
A good example of this three-step analysis is provided by the Supreme Court of Delaware in Folk v York-Shipley, which applied this inter-systemic method to a conflict between the laws of different US states. 28 The plaintiff, a Delaware domiciliary whose husband had died in a car collision in Pennsylvania, sued for loss of her husband's consortium. Such a cause of action existed in Delaware's law but not in Pennsylvania's law. The court first had to characterize this issue as one of tort law (liability for a car accident) or one of family law (injury to a marriage): a tort claim would be governed by the law of the place of the injury, whereas a family law claim could arguably have been governed by the law of the common spousal domicile, which was Delaware. Once the issue was characterized as one of tort law, in a second step the place of the injury had to be determined and was determined to be the place of the car accident (Pennsylvania), not the place where the wife lived and where arguably her consortium was lost (Delaware). In a third step, finally, the Delaware court determined that the law of Pennsylvania applied.
The court did not discuss, though it could have, whether Pennsylvania law should remain inapplicable because it violated a fundamental policy of Delaware so it would.
A second approach, developed in opposition to the traditional method described above, is called governmental interest analysis. The starting point for this method is the 'governmental' interest of a state in having its own law applied. Hence, the substance of the respective laws provides the starting point of the analysis (though their respective quality or desirability is not normally a criterion). Here, the first step is to determine which rules of law claim applicability, in view of both their text and of whether the respective legislative intent would be furthered by their application. asserted policies, a commonly held multi-state policy, and the degree of effective control each state has over the matter. 32 In Europe, a functional approach led not to a rejection but a refinement of the traditional approach. 33 The three steps of the European approach outlined above were maintained but disentangled from the idea that the applicable law should be based on the power of the state over its territory and its citizens. In all of these functional approaches, the search is ultimately for the most appropriate law, the law with the closest connection to the facts, considering a variety of factors.
B. PREREQUISITES
The above conflict-of-laws methods are quite closely linked to relations between different legal systems. They do not function well for intra-systemic conflicts. To explain why this is the case we must engage in a somewhat more elaborate discussion because the reasons are slightly different for each of the approaches discussed.
The traditional method is hard to apply to intra-systemic conflicts for two reasons.
First, the approach presumes that the conflict occurs between two legal orders that are essentially complete, insofar as each of them must have rules in the same area of law: tort law, contract law, etc. Where, for example, the issue is characterized as one of tort law, the conflict is between two tort laws (eg those of Pennsylvania and Delaware). Although such situations exist also, occasionally, within legal systems (eg between general contract law and consumer contract law), a second reason makes the traditional approach difficult to apply to almost all intra-systemic conflicts. Under the traditional approach, the applicable law is determined through either a territorial or a personal connecting factor, and such factors are often absent within legal systems. 34 The distinction between general contract law and consumer contract law, for example, cannot be made on the basis of territorial factors because they are not territorially distinct. conflicts-that between nuisance as a tort and property, for example-cannot.
Governmental interest analysis, in turn, is hard to apply to intra-systemic conflicts for a related reason: it assumes the coexistence of two governments whose interests are in question and potentially in conflict. As between two systems, each with its own government, it may be possible to determine which government has the greater interest.
Within one legal system, this is impossible, as long as, at least in theory, the same government or 'lawmaker' is concerned. whether we are within one system or between systems. Indeed, in this sense the functional approach to inter-systemic conflicts is in many ways not so different from the functional approach to intra-systemic conflicts discussed above. However, differences do exist. First, in intra-systemic conflicts the focus is on balancing laws (recall the IP versus anti-trust law example); in inter-systemic conflicts it is on balancing respective regulatory interests (recall the notion of comparative impairment). Second, in intra-systemic conflicts, the functional approach aims at coherence; in inter-systemic conflicts, it aims at coordination. Third, in intra-systemic conflicts, a functional approach can lead to mixed or compromise solutions; in inter-systemic conflicts, the aim is to maintain the internal integrity of each system by designating one or the other, and to minimize the consequences of frictions.
IV. INTERACTIONS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
Which of the above approaches is more adequate for conflicts within public international law or for fragmented public international law? At first sight, the core question may seem to be whether international law is more like one system or more like the combination of several systems: if it is one system, we should use a conflict-of-norms approach; if it is a combination of systems, we should use a private international law approach.
We do not think this is the most useful order of steps. Whether international law behaves like a system or not is in no small part determined by the very way in which relations between rules are handled. If we choose intra-systemic rules to govern relations between, say, the international trade and climate change regimes, this very choice constructs international law as a system. If we choose inter-systemic rules to address interactions, this constructs public international law as a plurality and a uniform system of public international law no longer emerges. This suggests, however, that we need not start with the ontological question (Is public international law one system or not?).
Instead, we can start by addressing the pragmatic question of which rules work best for different contexts (conflict of norms or conflict of laws?) and determine in the light of the answers how to understand public international law.
A. Finally, the presumption against conflict and the principle of 'systemic integration', as they are known in international law, 42 are (much like the intra-systemic literal rule discussed earlier`) built on the premise that the legislator or specific group of contracting states must be presumed not to want to deviate from, or contradict, an earlier expression or rule. Again, for the intra-systemic type of interaction between general international law and treaties this presumption fits well: we can presume that, for example, two states that conclude a treaty did so with the background of general international law, to which they are both bound, in mind. The same is often true with respect to the lex specialis principle: how is one to decide whether, for example, a restriction on trade in an endangered species is more specifically covered by a WTO rule (as a trade matter) or by a CITES provision (as an environmental matter), given that no neutral higher authority exists to make this decision? And should treaty parties be able to undermine their WTO obligations merely by formulating a specific rule? This is, in our view, in no small measure due to the fact that this type of conflict is more akin to inter-systemic conflict for which intra-systemic conflict rules such as lex posterior and lex specialis were not designed.
GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES
There are two reasons why intra-systemic rules may be inadequate. The first is that the fiction of the unitary lawmaker, a prerequisite of these rules as we saw earlier, The second reason, related to the first, is that when it comes to tensions between branches of international law it becomes difficult to devise a neutral perspective from which neutral conflict solutions could be formulated. Instead, each branch typically has its own rules or perspective for dealing with conflicts, and these rules or starting points often differ. For example, as noted earlier, there may be little point in trying to define the lex specialis in the interaction between trade agreements and environmental agreements:
from the perspective of the trade agreement, the trade rule will be more specific (as in 'trade in' environmentally sensitive goods); from the viewpoint of the environmental treaty, the environmental rule will be more specific (as in 'environmental concerns' related to trade).
Sometimes, this neutrality problem becomes explicit in the text of conventions.
GATT Article XXIV, for example, states that regional trade agreements such as NAFTA are subject to certain GATT principles, thereby setting up the GATT as lex superior.
Article Here, we can only sketch some such possibilities. One would be to develop private-international-law rules on the basis of connecting factors, except that these connecting factors cannot be those of territory or personality (as in domestic intersystemic conflict rules) but must be functional, institutional and/or procedural connecting factors pointing toward one branch of international law rather than the other (eg as the 'proper law'). Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, who advocate a somewhat comparable approach, argue that any solution of the conflict cannot result in an either/or decision but must somehow combine aspects of both regimes, because most conflicts have relevant effects within more than one sub-system. 56 But effects within more than one system are characteristic of traditional private-international-law situations between states, too. In the example from the Delaware court discussed earlier, 57 the claim for loss of consortium undoubtedly has effects in both tort and family law, and in both Pennsylvania and Delaware. Here, the goal is not to determine whether the issue is 'really' one of tort or one of marriage law (it clearly touches on both), but instead which law is more appropriately applied. Similarly, in international law, we would not ask whether an issue 'really' belongs to trade or environmental law, but rather, which regime is more appropriate to be applied to the particular fact pattern. Applying the trade rather than the environmental regime is not a simple preference of trade interests over environment interest, but a preference of the decision in the trade regime on the role of environmental concerns over the decision within the environmental regime on the role of trade. This is a 56 Fischer-Lescano and Teubner (n 11) 1021-22. 57 See n 28 above.
question not confined to 'true conflicts'; it is a question also where the different regimes provide norms that are equivalent, in other words, the case of MSEN.
Arguably, this is what really goes on when international tribunals exercise the jurisdiction to 'interpret the submissions of the parties' so as to 'isolate the real issue in the case and to identify the object of the claim'. 58 We can also find such a search for the 'closest connection' in the decision in Southern Bluefin Tuna. The tribunal in that case did not think the conflict belonged only to one or the other regime, as 'it is a commonplace of international law and State Practice for more than one treaty to bear upon a particular with its special regime for MSEN. Here, the otherwise necessary connection between rule and context is given up. Instead, the provision adopts an approach comparable to governmental interest analysis of laws, where the situation described would be viewed as a false conflict: not a situation in which only one regime is interested in the application of its law, but a situation in which the application of one law in fact furthers the interests of the other regime as well. Under governmental interest analysis, such situations are typically resolved in favour of forum law: New York is free to apply its own wrongful death statute if doing so furthers also the policies of Massachusetts. Here, the resolution is in favour of the rules of the WTO, but structurally this is not different. In both cases, of-laws approach seems most promising. This is the link between MSEN, the general topic of this volume, and the conflict-of-laws alternative, suggested in this chapter.
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: IS INTERNATIONAL LAW A SYSTEM?
So far, we have deliberately discussed the technical question -the respective adequacy of different sets of rules for different types of public international law conflicts -without addressing the ontological question whether international law is a system. The result has been that international law can actually borrow rules from both, and that different sets of rules are better for different types of conflicts. This means that the normative implications of whether international law is a system are actually not that great. Nonetheless, the question remains relevant, and some implications emerge from our analysis.
One tendency seems to be this: interactions between treaty-regimes (eg the WTO) and general international law (eg the law of treaties or state responsibility) are better resolved with rules made for intra-systemic conflicts and relate to international law as a 'system'. Similarly, conflicts within branches of international law, for example within the WTO treaty, appear to benefit from intra-systemic rules and thereby suggest that it makes sense to conceive of the WTO as a (sub-)system.
In contrast, for interactions between specialized treaty regimes (say, environmental law versus trade law), traditional intra-systemic rules do not always provide satisfactory frameworks for analysis. However, as we demonstrate above, this emergence of different sub-systems or legal pluralism need not result in anarchy. Rather, coordination between these branches or sub-systems can occur, albeit imperfectly, through inter-systemic conflict-of-laws rules. This suggests that in these aspects international law is better seen as an unsystematic plurality of systems or regimes, without the need of conceiving these systems as self-contained.
What does this mean for the question whether international law is a system or not?
First, we have seen that the question is far less important than the drafters of the ILC Fragmentation Report appear to have thought, because the technical question -which set of rules is adequate for which type of interaction between rules -can be answered without recourse to this ontological question. Second, to the extent that the answers to the technical question allow for conclusions, they suggest that it is useful to conceive of international law as a system for some aspects and as the interaction of various systems in others. It suggests that one set of conflicts rules -conflict-of-norms rules -is appropriate for one set of conflicts, and another set of conflicts rules -conflict-of-laws rules -is appropriate for the other. The criticism of international law as a system thus has it half right: international law is not a full-fledged system, and traditional conflict-of-norms rules are not always appropriate to resolve public international law conflicts. However, this finding does not lead to anarchy but instead into another set of conflicts rules.
International law may, therefore, be a system at some level (in the sense, for example, that all of its rules and branches interact and are governed by certain general rules without there being so-called self-contained regimes 72 ), but a universe of different systems, sub-systems or branches at another level (in the sense, for example, that rules within the WTO treaty interact differently than a WTO rule interacts with the Kyoto Protocol). The outcome is not chaos and anarchy but a more sophisticated legal landscape, consequence of, to use the very title of the ILC Study Group, 'the diversification and expansion of international law'. Put differently, applying private international law solutions to public international law conflicts -or recognizing that certain conflicts of international law may be more akin to a conflict between Belgian and German law than a conflict between one Belgian norm and another -need not mean the end of international law. On the contrary, it highlights the increased maturity and complexity of international law and its unique, hybrid features as a sui generis type of legal order.
If all of this is correct, then the first question for relations between international law norms, or regimes, is neither whether international law is a system or not, nor which norm or which regime should prevail, if any. The first question is which approach should be used to resolve the conflict, that of conflict of norms or that of conflict of laws. This question cannot and need not be determined with regard to an ontology of international law; it must be established anew for many new conflicts. The dynamic and evolutionary 72 Or as the ILC Study Group puts it: 'Its rules and principles (ie its norms) act in relation to and should be interpreted against the background of other rules and principles', see 'Conclusions of the Study Group' above (n 1) para 251 (conclusion 1) (p407).
character of international law makes it unlikely that the internal differentiation of international law either is static or follows a predetermined path. The dependence of international law on its actual practice suggests that how we resolve certain conflicts has an effect on the very nature of these conflicts. How we resolve conflicts determines what international law is. This is one more reason for why we should think hard before blindly applying the conventional wisdom of conflict of norms. As international law diversifies and matures, some public international law conflicts may well be best resolved through private international law solutions. This chapter opens the way for such alternative approach. Elaborating specific conflict-of-law rules for certain public international law conflicts is the logical next step.
